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Abstract
Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered
based exclusively on users’ feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit2 employ this
type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts
according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very
little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a
formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic
measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide
a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to
correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour.
We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios.
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1 Introduction
The modern Internet contains an immense amount of data; a single user can only consume
a tiny fraction in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, any widely used platform that
hosts user-generated content (UGC) must employ a content curation mechanism. Content
curation can be understood as the set of mechanisms which rank, aggregate and filter relevant
information. In recent years, popular news aggregation sites like Reddit3 or Hacker News4
have established crowdsourced curation as the primary way to filter content for their users.
Crowdsourced content curation, as opposed to more traditional techniques such as expert- or
1 Contact author
2 https://steemit.com/ Accessed: 2019-01-02
3 https://www.reddit.com/ Accessed: 2019-01-02
4 https://news.ycombinator.com/ Accessed: 2019-01-02
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algorithmic-based curation, orders and filters content based on the ratings and feedback of
the users themselves, obviating the need for a central moderator by leveraging the “wisdom
of the crowd” [3, 46].
The decentralized nature of crowdsourced curation makes it a suitable solution for
ranking user-generated content in blockchain-based content hosting systems. The aggregation
and filtering of user-generated content emerges as a particularly challenging problem in
permissionless blockchains, as any solution that requires a concrete moderator implies that
there exists a privileged party, which is incompatible with a permissionless blockchain.
Moreover, public blockchains are easy targets for Sybil attacks [10], as any user can create
new accounts at any time for a marginal cost. Therefore, on-chain mechanisms to resist the
effect of Sybil users are necessary for a healthy and well-functioning platform; traditional
counter-Sybil mechanisms [29] are much harder to apply in the case of blockchains due to
the decentralized nature of the latter. The functions performed by moderators in traditional
content platforms need to be replaced by incentive mechanisms that ensure self-regulation.
Having the impact of a vote depend on the number of coins the voter holds is an intuitively
appealing strategy to achieve a proper alignment of incentives for users in decentralized
content platforms; specifically, it can render Sybil attacks impossible.
However, the correct design of such systems is still an unsolved problem. Blockchains
have created a new economic paradigm where users are at the same time equity holders in the
system, and leveraging this property in a robust manner constitutes an interesting challenge.
A variety of projects have designed decentralized content curation systems [27, 42, 16].
Nevertheless, a deep understanding of the properties of such systems is still lacking. Among
them, Steemit has a long track record, having been in operation since 2016 and attaining
a user base of more than 1.08 M5 registered accounts6. Steemit is a social media platform
which lets users earn money (in the form of the STEEM cryptocurrency) by both creating and
curating content in the network. Steemit is the front-end of the social network, a graphical
web interface which allows users to see the content of the platform. On the other hand, all
the back-end information is stored on a distributed ledger, the Steem blockchain. Steem can
be understood as an “app-chain”, a blockchain with a specific application purpose: serving
as a distributed database for social media applications [42].
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work we study the foundations of decentralized content curation from a computational
perspective. We develop an abstract model of a post-voting system which aims to sort the
posts created by users in a distributed and crowdsourced manner. Our model is constituted
by a functionality which executes a protocol performed by N players. The model includes an
honest participant behaviour while it allows deviations to be modeled for a subset of the
participants. The N players contribute votes in a round-based curation process. The impact
of each vote depends on the number of coins held by the player. The posts are arranged in
a list, sorted by the value of votes received, resembling the front-page model of Reddit or
Hacker News. In the model, players vote according to their subjective opinion on the quality
of the posts and have a limited attention span.
Following previous related work [14, 3], we represent each player’s opinion on each post
(i.e. likability) with a numerical value l ∈ [0, 1]. The objective quality of a post is calculated
as the simple summation of all players’ likabilities for the post in question. To measure
5 https://steemdb.com/accounts Accessed: 2019-01-02
6 The number of accounts should not be understood as the number of active users, as one user can create
multiple accounts.
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the effectiveness of a post-voting system, we introduce the property of convergence under
honesty which is parameterised by a number of values including a metric t, that demands the
first t articles to be ordered according to the objective quality of the posts at the end of the
execution assuming all participants signal honestly to the system their personal preferences.
Armed with our post-voting system abstraction, we proceed to particularize it to model
Steemit and provide the following results.
(i) We characterise the conditions under which the Steemit algorithm converges under
honesty. Our results highlight some fundamental limitations of the actual Steemit
parameterization. Specifically, for curated lists of length bigger than 70 the algorithm
may not achieve even 1-convergence.
(ii) We validate our results with a simulation testing different metrics based on correlation
that have been proposed in previous works [25, 37] and relating them to our notion of
convergence.
(iii) We demonstrate that “selfish” deviation from honest behavior results to substantial
gains in terms of boosting the ranking of specific posts in the resulting list of the
post-voting system, and to a grave reduction of the quality of said list.
1.2 Steem consensus algorithm
In a nutshell, Delegated Proof of Stake [8, 36, 41] works as follows: Steem users can sign up
as “validator” candidates for one of 21 slots. Each user that owns some STEEM can vote for
a validator. The 20 candidates that receive the most votes (weighted by the respective users’
STEEM) become validators. The 21st slot is filled with one of the candidates that was not
elected, chosen at random with probability proportional to her votes.
A validator is responsible for receiving new transactions and adding them to blocks.
Validators take turns in block production. An honest validator attaches her block to the
latest valid block she knows and broadcasts it to the network. We say that a round is
complete after each validator has had a chance to create a block. Honest nodes accept the
longest known chain as the valid one. Elections for validators happen once each round, thus
each STEEM holder is allowed to change her opinion very often.
The protocol promises that all new transactions are permanently added to the blockchain
in a short amount of time, given that at least two thirds of the validators are honest.
Unfortunately, we were unable to locate a formal proof of this claim.
Note that our analysis does not focus on DPOS, but on the curation mechanism of
Steemit. The latter is independent of the consensus protocol of Steem.
2 Related Work
User-generated content (UGC) has been identified as a fundamental component of social
media platforms and Web 2.0 in general [24]. The content created by users needs to be curated,
and crowdsourced content curation [3] has emerged as an alternative to expert-based [38]
or algorithmic-based [35] curation techniques. Motivated by the widespread adoption of
crowdsourced aggregation sites such as Reddit or Digg7, several research efforts [9, 14, 1] have
aimed to model the mechanics and incentives for users in UGC platforms. This surge of interest
is accompanied by studies which have shown how social media users behave strategically
when they publish and consume content [32]. As an example, in the case of Reddit, users try
to maximize their “karma” [4], the social badge of the social media platform [2].
7 http://digg.com/ Accessed: 2019-01-02
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Previous works have analyzed content curation from an incentives and game-theoretic
standpoint [14, 9, 21, 32, 1] . Our formalisation is based on these models and inherits features
such as the quality distribution of the articles and the users’ attention span [3, 14]. In
terms of the analysis of our results, the analysis of our t-convergence metric is similar to
the top-k posts in [3]. We also leverage the rank correlation coefficients Kendall’s Tau [25]
and Spearman’s Rho [37] to measure content curation efficiency. Our approach describes
the mechanics of post-voting systems from a computational perspective, something that
departs from the approach of all previous works, drawing inspiration from the real-ideal
world paradigm of cryptography [17, 30] as employed in our definition of t-convergence.
Post-voting systems constitute a special case of voting mechanisms, as studied within
social choice theory, belonging to the subcategory of cardinal voting systems [22]. In this
context, it follows from Gibbard’s theorem [15] that no decentralised non-trivial post-voting
mechanism can be strategy-proof. This is consistent with our results that demonstrate
how selfish behaviour is beneficial to the participants. Our system shares the property of
spanning multiple voting rounds with previous work [23]. Other related literature in social
choice [31, 6, 44] is centered on political elections and as a result attempts to resolve a
variation of the problem with quite different constraints and assumptions. In more detail, in
the case of political elections, voter communication in many rounds is costly while navigating
the ballot is not subject to any constraints as voters are assumed to have plenty of time to
parse all the options available to them. As a result, voters can express their preferences for
any candidate, irrespective of the order in which the latter appear on the ballot paper. On
the other hand, the online and interactive nature of post-voting systems make multi-round
voting a natural feature to be taken advantage of. At the same time, the fairness requirements
are more lax and it is acceptable (even desirable) for participants to act reactively on the
outcome of each others’ evaluations. On the other hand, in the post-voting case, the “ballot”
is only partially available given the high number of posts to be ranked that may very well
exceed the time available to a (human) user to participate in the process. As a result a
user will be unable to vote for posts that she has not viewed, for instance, because they are
placed at the bottom of the list. This is captured in our model by introducing the concept of
“attention span”.
Content curation is also related to the concept of online governance. The governance of
online communities such as Wikipedia has been thoroughly studied in previous academic
work [28, 13]. However, the financially incentivized governance processes in blockchain
systems, where the voters are at the same time equity-holders, have still many open research
questions [5, 12]. This shared ownership property has triggered interest in building social
media platforms backed by distributed ledgers, where users are rewarded for generated content
and variants of coin-holder voting are used to decide how these rewards are distributed.
As already mentioned, coin-weighted voting is a viable mechanism to measure the influence
of users in the platform and, by extension, to make the system more resistant to Sybil attacks.
Different countermeasures for the Sybil problem in content curation and recommendation
sites have been explored in the past [34, 40, 45, 33]. Orthogonal to the coin-weighted voting
model, these solutions leverage the trust graph of the underlying social network (which
is explicitly created by users) to bound the effect of Sybil votes [34, 40, 45]. [43] claim
that trust graph-based solutions require heavy computation, and propose optimizations for
real-world applications modeling the transitive trust relationships as credit networks. We
acknowledge these mechanisms as complementary to coin-weighted voting and potentially
implementable in Steemit. We note that the abstract post-voting system defined in this work
can be particularized to include such trust graph-based solutions.
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The effects of explicit financial incentives on the quality of content in Steemit has been
analyzed in [39]. Beyond the Steemit’s whitepaper [42], a series of blog posts [18, 19]
effectively extend the economic analysis of the system. In parallel with Steemit, other
projects such as Synereo [27] and Akasha8 are exploring the convergence of social media and
decentralized content curation. Beyond blockchain-based social media platforms, coin-holder
voting systems are present in decentralized platforms such as DAOs [7] and in different
blockchain protocols [11, 20]. However, most of these systems use coin-holder voting processes
to agree on a value or take a consensual decision.
3 Model
We first introduce some useful notation:
We denote an ordered list of elements with A = [e1, . . . , en] and the i-th element of the
list with A [i] = ei.
Let n ∈ N∗. [n] denotes {1, 2, . . . , n}.
3.1 Post list
I Definition 1 (Post). Let N ∈ N∗. A post is defined as P = (m, l), with m ∈ [N ] , l ∈ [0, 1]N .
Author. The first element of a post is the id of its creator m.
Likability. The likability of a post is defined as l ∈ [0, 1]N .
N represents the number of voters (a.k.a. players). A post has a distinct likability in [0, 1]
for each player.
I Definition 2 (Ideal Score of a post). Let post P = (m, l). We define the ideal score of P
as idealSc (P ) =
|l|∑
i=1
li.
The ideal score of a post is a single number that represents its overall worth to the community.
By using simple summation, we assume that the opinions of all players have the same weight.
I Definition 3 (Post List). Let M ∈ N∗. A post list P = [P1, . . . , PM ] is an ordered list
containing posts. It may be the case that two posts are identical.
In the case of many UGC platforms, e.g. Steemit, there exists a feed (commonly named
“Trending”) that displays the same ordered posts for all users. In such an ordered list, posts
placed closer to the top are more visible, since users typically consume content from top to
bottom. We can thus measure the quality of an ordered list of posts by comparing it with a
list that contains the same posts in decreasing order of ideal score.
I Definition 4 (t-Ideal Post Order). Let P a list of posts, t ∈ [M ]. The property Idealt (P)
holds if
∀i < j ∈ [t], idealSc (P [i]) ≥ idealSc (P [j]) .
We say that P has a t-ideal rank if Idealt (P) holds and t is the maximum integer less or
equal to M with this property.
8 https://akasha.world/ Accessed: 2019-01-02
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3.2 Post Voting System
We now define an abstract post-voting system. Such a system is defined through two
Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs), GFeed and Πhonest. The first controls the list of posts
and aggregates votes, whereas one copy of the second ITM is instantiated for each player.
GFeed sends the post list to one player at a time, receives her vote and reorders the post list
accordingly. The process is possibly repeated for many rounds.
A measure of the quality of a post-voting system is the t-ideal rank of the post list at the
end of the process.
In a more general setting, some of the honest protocol instantiations may be replaced with
an arbitrary ITM. A robust post-voting system should still produce a post list of high quality.
I Definition 5 (Post-Voting System). Consider four PPT algorithms Init, Aux, Handle-
Vote and Vote. The tuple S consisting of the four algorithms is a Post-Voting System. S
parametrizes the following two ITMs:
GFeed is a global functionality that accepts two messages: read, which responds with the
current list of posts and vote, which can take various arguments and does whatever is defined
in HandleVote.
Πhonest is a protocol that sends read and vote messages to GFeed whenever it receives
(activate) from E.
Algorithm 1 GFeed (Init,Aux,HandleVote) (P, initArgs).
1: Initialization:
2: U ← ∅ . Set of players
3: Init (initArgs)
4:
5: Upon receiving (read) from upid:
6: U ← U ∪ {upid}
7: aux← Aux (upid)
8: Send (posts, P, aux) to upid
9:
10: Upon receiving (vote, ballot) from upid:
11: HandleVote(ballot)
Algorithm 2 Πhonest (Vote).
1: Upon receiving (activate) from E :
2: Send (read) to GFeed
3: Wait for response (posts, P, aux)
4: ballot← Vote (P, aux)
5: Send (vote, ballot) to GFeed
Players are activated by an Environment ITM that sends activation messages (Algorithm 2,
line 1).
I Definition 6 (Post-Voting System Activation Message). We define actpid as the message
(activate,pid), sent to upid.
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I Definition 7 (Execution Pattern). Let N,R ∈ N∗, N ≥ 2.
ExecPatN,R =
{(
actpid1 , . . . , actpidNR
)
: ∀i ∈ [R] ,∀k ∈ [N ] ,∃j ∈ [N ] : pid(i−1)N+j = k
}
,
i.e. activation messages are grouped in R rounds and within each round each player is
activated exactly once. The order of activations is not fixed.
Let Environment E that sends messages msgs = (actpid1 , . . . , actpidn) sequentially. We
say that E respects ExecPatN,R if msgs ∈ ExecPatN,R. (Note: this implies that n = NR.)
I Definition 8 ((N,R,M, t)-convergence under honesty). We say that a post-voting system
S = (Init,Aux,HandleVote,Vote) (N,R,M, t)-converges under honesty (or t-converges
under honesty for N players, R rounds andM posts) if, for every input P such that |P| = M ,
for every E that respects ExecPatN,R and given that all protocols execute Πhonest, it holds that
after E completes its execution pattern, GFeed contains a post list P ′ such that Idealt (P ′)
is true.
Note that concrete post voting systems may or may not give information such as the total
number of rounds R to the players. This is decided in algorithm Aux.
We now give a high-level description of a concrete post voting system, based on the
Steemit platform. According to this mechanism, each player is assigned a number of coins
known as “Steem Power” (SP) that remains constant throughout the execution and another
number called “Voting Power” (VP) in [0, 1], initialized to 1. a and b are system-wide
constants that roughly specify how influential a single vote is. A vote is a pair containing
a post and a weight w ∈ [0, 1]. Upon receiving a list of posts, the honest player chooses to
vote her most liked post amongst the top attSpan posts of the list. The weight w is chosen
to be equal to the likability of the post. The functionality increases the score of the post
by SP (a ·VP · w + b) and subsequently decreases the player’s Voting Power by the same
amount (but keeping it within the aforementioned bounds). Voting Power is replenished
with time, at a rate defined by the parameter regen. The purpose of Voting Power is to “rate
limit” votes.
I Definition 9 (Steemit system). The Steemit system is the post voting system S with
parameters a, b, regen ∈ [0, 1] : a + b < 1,
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
> 1, attSpan ∈ N∗,SP ∈ RN+ . The four
parametrizing procedures can be found in Appendix B.
I Remark 10. The constraint a+ b < 1 ensures that a single vote of full weight cast by a
player with full Voting Power does not completely deplete her Voting Power. The constraint⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
> 1 excludes the degenerate case in which the regeneration of a single round is
enough to fully replenish the Voting Power in all cases; in this case the purpose of Voting
Power would be defeated.
I Remark 11. The Steem blockchain protocol defines a = 0.02, b = 0.0001 and regen =
3
5·24·60·60 = 0.00000694¯, thus
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
= 2895. A post can be voted for 7 days from its creation
and at most one vote can be cast every 3 seconds, thus R = 7·24·60·603 = 201600. We do not
know why these particular parameters were chosen, but we conjecture that a, b and regen
ensure users can vote often enough without abusing the system, 7 days is the time needed
for the quality of a post to be determined and 3 seconds is the time needed for transactions
to settle in the Steem blockchain.
Tokenomics 2019
3:8 A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation
I Remark 12. Note (Algorithm 6, lines 24-40) that an honest player attempts to vote for as
many posts as possible and spreads her votes with the maximum distance between them.
The purpose of this is to efficiently utilize the available Voting Power to “make her voice
heard”. Also, efficiently using Voting Power on the Steemit website increases the voter’s
curation reward [18].
I Theorem 13.
1. If ∃i 6= j ∈ [N ] : SPi 6= SPj (i.e. if not all players have the same Steem Power) then
Steemit does not (N,R,M, 1)-converge.
2. If ∀i 6= j ∈ [N ] ,SPi = SPj (i.e. if all players have the same Steem Power) and
a. R− 1 ≥ (M − 1)
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
then Steemit (N,R,M,M)-converges.
b. R− 1 < (M − 1)
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
then Steemit does not (N,R,M, 1)-converge.
Proof Sketch. When SP is not constant, we build a post list where the most liked post is
not preferred by rich players and thus is not placed at the top. For a constant SP, when
R−1 ≥ (M − 1)
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
, there are enough rounds to ensure full regeneration of every player’s
Voting Power between two votes and thus the resulting post list reflects the true preferences
of the players. In the opposite case, we can always craft a post list that exploits the fact
that some votes are cast with reduced Voting Power in order to trick the system into placing
a wrong post in the top position. J
See Appendix A for proof.
I Corollary 14. The Steemit system parametrised according to Remark 11, for any number
of players N ≥ 2, constant SP and M ≤ 70 posts (N,R,M,M)-converges. If M > 70 or SP
is not constant, then there exists a list of posts such that the system does not (N,R,M, 1)-
converge.
4 Simulation
The previous outcomes are here complemented with experiments that verify our findings. We
have implemented a simulation framework that realizes the execution of Steemit’s post-voting
system as defined above.
In particular, we consider two separate scenarios: First, we simulate the case when all
players follow the prescribed honest strategy of Steemit, investigating how the curation
quality of the system varies with the number of voting rounds. We successfully reproduce
the result of Theorem 13, which implies that the system converges perfectly when a sufficient
number of voting rounds is permitted, but otherwise the resulting list of posts may have a
0-ideal rank, i.e. the top post may not have the best ideal score. Moreover, we compare
our t-convergence metric with previously used metrics of convergence based on correlation
demonstrating that they are very closely aligned.
The second case measures how resilient is the curation quality of Steemit against dishonest
agents. Since a creator is financially rewarded when her content is upvoted, she has incentive
to promote her own posts. A combination of in-band methods (apart from striving to produce
posts of higher quality) can help her to that end. Voting for one’s own posts, refraining
from voting posts created by others and obtaining Sybil accounts that only vote for her
posts are only an indicative subset. We thus examine the quality of the resulting list when
certain users do not follow the honest protocol, but apply the aforementioned self-promoting
methods. We observe that even a single selfish player has a detrimental effect to the t-ideal
rank of the post voting system. Furthermore, we measure the number of positions on the list
that the selfish post gains with respect to the number of selfish players.
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4.1 Methodology
We leverage three metrics to compare the curated list with the ideal list: Kendall’s Tau [25],
Spearman’s Rho [37], and t-ideal rank.
In addition to the t-ideal rank and the rank correlation coefficients used in the first
scenario, in the case of dishonest participants we include a metric that measures the gains
of the selfish players. In particular, the metric is defined as the difference between the real
position of the “selfish” post after the execution and its ranking according to the ideal order.
We are thus able to measure how advantageous is for users to behave selfishly. Furthermore,
t-ideal rank informs us how this behavior affects the overall quality of curation of the platform.
4.2 Execution
In all simulations, the likabilities of all “honest” posts have been drawn from the [0, 1]-uniform
distribution and all players have Steem Power equal to 1; we leave the case of variable Steem
Power as future work.
(a) t-ideal rank evolution. (b) Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s Rho evolution.
Figure 1 270 honest players, 70 posts and 200.000 rounds.
(a) t-ideal rank evolution. (b) Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s Rho evolution.
Figure 2 300 honest players, 100 posts and 200.000 rounds.
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(a) Positions gained by selfish post. (b) t-ideal rank.
Figure 3 100 honest players, 100 posts and 0 to 100 selfish players.
4.2.1 Scenario A
As already mentioned, the results closely follow Theorem 13. Figures 1a and 1b show
the t-ideal rank and Kendall’s Tau coefficient respectively when the number of rounds is
enough for all votes to be cast with full Voting Power. In particular, the parameters used
are a = 150 , b = 10−4, regen =
3
5·24·60·60 , R = 200000, attSpan = 10, N = 270 and M = 70.
(Observe that R− 1 > (M − 1)
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
.)
As we can see, all three measures show that the real list converges rapidly to the ideal
order at the very end of the execution; meanwhile, the quality of the list improves very slowly.
Figures 2a and 2b depict what happens when the rounds are not sufficient for all votes to be
cast with full Voting Power. In particular, the corresponding simulation was executed with the
same parameters, except forM = 100 and N = 300. (Observe that R−1 < (M − 1)
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
.)
Here we see that at the end of the execution, only the first three posts are correctly
ordered. Regarding the rest of the list, both Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s Rho coefficients
show that the order of the posts improves only slightly throughout the execution of the
simulation, ending up in a state of bad quality.
4.2.2 Scenario B: Selfish users
In order to understand how the presence of voting rings/Sybil accounts affects the curation
quality, we simulate the execution of the game for various ring sizes, where ring members
vote only for a particular “selfish” post. We fix the rest of the system parameters to
handicap the selfish post. In particular, the voting rounds are sufficient for all votes to
be cast with full Voting Power, the likability of the selfish post is 0 for all players and
it is initially placed at the bottom of the post list. Define the gain of the post of the
selfish players as its ideal position minus its final position. Figure 3a shows the gain of
the selfish post for a varying number of selfish players, from 1 to 100. Figure 3b depicts
the t-ideal rank of the resulting list at the same executions. The system parameters are
N = 101..200, a = 150 , b = 10−4, regen =
3
5·24·60 , attSpan = 10, R = 5000.
As we can see in Figure 3a, there is a cutoff point around which the selfish players quickly
move from gaining no positions to overtaking all honest posts. The number of selfish players
needed for this advantage is approximately half of the amount of honest ones. On the other
hand, figure 3b shows that even a single selfish player can almost completely ruin the t-ideal
rank of the result by only allowing a very small number of the best posts to be placed in the
correct order.
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5 Summary and Future Work
We have defined an abstract post-voting system, along with a particularization inspired by the
Steemit platform. We proved the exact conditions on the Steemit system parameters under
which it successfully curates arbitrary lists of posts. We provided the results of simulations
of the execution of the voting procedure under various conditions. Both cases with only
honest and mixed honest and selfish players were simulated. We conclude that the Voting
Power mechanism of Steem and the fact that self-voting is a profitable strategy may hurt
curation quality.
We have studied the curation properties of decentralized content curation platforms such
as Steemit, obtaining new insights on the resilience of these systems. Some assumptions
have been made in the presented model. Various relaxations of these assumptions constitute
fertile ground for future work. First of all, the selfish strategy can be extended and refined
in various ways. For example, voting rings can be allowed to create more than one posts in
order to increase their rewards. Optimizing the number of posts and the vote allocation in
this case would contribute towards a robust attack against the Steemit platform.
Selfish behavior is considered only in the simulation. Our analysis can be augmented
with a review of games with selfish players and voting rings.
The addition of the economic factor invites the definition of utility functions and strategic
behavior for the players. Its inclusion would imply the need for an expansion of our theorems
and definitions to the strategic case, along with a full game-theoretic analysis. Furthermore,
several possible refinements could be introduced; for example, the process of creating Sybil
accounts could be associated with a monetary cost.
Last but not least, in our model, posts are created only at the beginning of the execution.
A dynamic model in which posts can be created at any time and the execution continues
indefinitely (as is the case in a real-world UGC system) is also interesting as a future direction.
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A Proof of Theorem 13: Steem Convergence
Proof.
Statement 1: Reorder the players such that SP1 ≥ SP2 ≥ · · · ≥ SPN . Let k =
min
j∈[N−1]
{SPj 6= SPj+1}. We first cover the case when attSpan ≥ 2.
Let9
weakPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−k
)
9 We thank Heng Guo from the University of Edinburgh for this counterexample.
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strongPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
,
SPk − SPk+1
2SPk
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−k−1
)
nullPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
)P = [weakPost, strongPost,nullPost, . . . ,nullPost︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−2
] .
We first note that SPk > SPk+1 ≥ 0 ⇒ 0 ≤ SPk−SPk+12SPk ≤ 1, thus strongPost is a valid
post. We then observe that
∀i ∈ {3, . . . ,M} , idealSc (P [i]) = 0 <
< idealSc (P [1]) = 1 < 1 + SPk − SPk+12SPk = idealSc (P [2]) ,
thus ∀P ′ that contain the same posts as P and Ideal1 (P ′) holds, it is P ′ [1] = P [2].
Since attSpan ≥ 2, all players apart from uk+1 vote for P [1] in the first round and for
P [2] in the second, whereas uk+1 votes for P [2] in the first round and for P [1] in the
second. Thus the two first posts will have been voted by all players by the end of the
second round and their score will not change until the execution completes. We have:
sc2 (P [1]) = scR (P [1]) =
k−1∑
j=1
SPjb+ SPk (a+ b) + SPk+1 min
{
b,VPregk+1,r2
}
+
M∑
j=k+2
SPjb and
sc2 (P [2]) = scR (P [2]) =
k−1∑
j=1
SPj min {b,VPregj,r2}+
SPk min {aSPk − SPk+12SPk VPregk,r2 + b,VPregk,r2}+ SPk+1 (a+ b) +
M∑
j=k+2
SPj min {b,VPregj,r2} ⇒
scR(P [2]) ≤
k−1∑
j=1
SPjb+ SPk(a
SPk − SPk+1
2SPk
+ b) + SPk+1 (a+ b) +
M∑
j=k+2
SPjb .
In the case that VPregk+1,r2 ≥ b, it is
scR (P [1]) =
k−1∑
j=1
SPjb+ SPk (a+ b) + SPk+1b+
M∑
j=k+2
SPjb >
k−1∑
j=1
SPjb+ SPk(a
SPk − SPk+1
2SPk
+ b) + SPk+1 (a+ b) +
M∑
j=k+2
SPjb ≥
scR (P [2])⇒ scR (P [1]) > scR (P [2]) ,
thus Ideal1 (P ′) does not hold.
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Since uk+1 does not vote in any round between r1 and r2, and r2 ≥ 2, it is VPregk+1,r2 ≥
1 − a − b + regen. Thus the case when VPregk+1,r2 < b can happen only when b >
1− a− b+ regen⇔ b > 1−a+regen2 . We now provide a counterexample for the case when
b > 1−a+regen2 .
Once more we order the players in descending Steem Power, like in the previous case.
Once again k = min
j∈[N−1]
{SPj 6= SPj+1} and we only care for the case when attSpan ≥ 2.
Let 0 < γ < 1 and
weakPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, 1, γ2 , 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−k−1
)
strongPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, γ, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−k−1
)
nullPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
)
P = [weakPost, strongPost,nullPost, . . . ,nullPost︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−2
] .
We observe that ∀i ∈ {3, . . . ,M} , idealSc (P [i]) = 0 < idealSc (P [1]) = 1 + γ2 < 1 + γ =
idealSc (P [2]), thus ∀P ′ that contain the same posts as P and Ideal1 (P ′) holds, it is
P ′ [1] = P [2].
Since attSpan ≥ 2, all players apart from uk+1 vote for P [1] in the first round and for
P [2] in the second, whereas uk+1 votes for P [2] in the first round and for P [1] in the
second. Thus the two first posts will have been voted by all players by the end of the
second round and their score will not change until the execution completes. We have:
sc2 (P [1]) = scR (P [1]) =
k−1∑
j=1
SPjb+ SPk (a+ b) + SPk+1VPregk+1,r2 +
M∑
j=k+2
SPjb and
sc2 (P [2]) = scR (P [2]) =
k−1∑
j=1
SPj min {b,VPregj,r2}+ SPkVPregk,r2 + SPk+1 (a+ b) +
M∑
j=k+2
SPj min {b,VPregj,r2} ≤
k−1∑
j=1
SPjb+ SPkVPregk,r2 + SPk+1 (a+ b) +
M∑
j=k+2
SPjb .
We note that VPregk,r2 = VPregk+1,r2 because both uk and uk+1 vote with full Voting
Power in the first round. Let VP = VPregk,r2 . We have
SPk (a+ b) + SPk+1VP > SPkVP + SPk+1 (a+ b)⇔
SPk (a+ b) + SPk+1VP− SPkVP− SPk+1 (a+ b) > 0⇔
(a+ b) (SPk − SPk+1)−VP (SPk − SPk+1) > 0⇔
(SPk − SPk+1) (a+ b−VP) > 0
The last expression is true because SPk > SPk+1 and VP < b, thus the first expression is
true as well. We can then deduce that scR (P [1]) > scR (P [2]), thus Ideal1 (P ′) does
not hold. Please refer to the full version [26] for the case when attSpan = 1.
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Statement 2a: Suppose that
R− 1 ≥ (M − 1)
⌈
a+ b
regen
⌉
. (1)
Observe that
(1)⇒ R− 1
M − 1 ≥
⌈
a+ b
regen
⌉
rhs⇒
integer
⌊
R− 1
M − 1
⌋
≥
⌈
a+ b
regen
⌉
. (2)
Let pid ∈ [N ]. From (1) we deduce that R ≥M and according to VoteThisRound in
Algorithm 6, upid votes non-null in rounds (r1, . . . , rM ) with ri =
⌊
(i− 1) R−1M−1
⌋
+ 1. We
define the following:
k ∈ N, w ∈ R ,
n ∈ Z, p ∈ [0, 1) : (k − 1)w = n+ p ,
m ∈ Z, q ∈ [0, 1) : w = m+ q .
We have
b(k − 1)wc = n , (3)
bkwc =
{
n+m, p+ q < 1
n+m+ 1, p+ q ≥ 1 (impossible if p = 0) (4)
bwc = m (5)
dwe =
{
m, p = 0
m+ 1, p > 0
(6)
(3), (4), (5), (6), p+ q < 2⇒
bkwc ∈ {b(k − 1)wc+ bwc, b(k − 1)wc+ dwe} (7)
From (7) we deduce that
∀i ∈ [M ] \ {1} , ri ∈ {ri−1 +
⌊
R− 1
M − 1
⌋
, ri−1 +
⌈
R− 1
M − 1
⌉
} . (8)
From (2) and (8) we have that ∀i ∈ [M − 1] , ri+1 − ri ≥
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
. We will now prove by
induction that ∀i ∈ [M ] ,VPpid,ri = 1.
For i = 1,VPpid,1 = 1 (Algorithm 3, line 4).
Let VPpid,ri = 1. Until ri+1, a single non-null vote is cast by upid, which reduces
VPpid by at most a+ b (Algorithm 5, line 7) and at least
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
regenerations, each
of which replenishes VPpid by regen. Thus
VPpid,ri+1 ≥ min {VPpid,ri − a− b+ regen
⌈
a+ b
regen
⌉
, 1} ≥ 1 .
But VPpid cannot exceed 1 (line 4), thus VPpid,ri+1 = 1.
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Since the above holds for every pid ∈ [N ], it holds that at the end of the execution, all votes
have been cast with full Voting Power, thus ∀i ∈ [M ] , scR (P [i]) = Nb+ a
N∑
pid=1
P [i]pid
and the posts in PR are sorted by decreasing score (Algorithm 5, line 20). We observe
that
∀i 6= j ∈ [M ] , idealSc (P [i]) > idealSc (P [j])⇒
N∑
pid=1
P [i]pid >
N∑
pid=1
P [j]pid ⇒
Nb+ a
N∑
pid=1
P [i]pid > Nb+ a
N∑
pid=1
P [j]pid .
Therefore all posts will be ordered according to their ideal scores; put otherwise,
IdealScoreM (PR) holds.
Statement 2b: Suppose that
R− 1 < (M − 1)
⌈
a+ b
regen
⌉
. (9)
Several lists of posts will be defined in the rest of the proof. Given that, when all players
are honest, the creator of a post is irrelevant, we omit the creator from the definition of
posts to facilitate the exposition. Thus every post will be defined as a tuple of likabilities.
First, we consider the case when
attSpan +R ≤M . (10)
In this case, no player can ever vote for the last post, as we will show now. First of all,
(10)⇒ R < M , thus all players cast R votes in total. Let pid ∈ N, i ∈ [R] and vpid,i the
index of the last post that has ever been in upid’s attention span until the end of round i,
according to the ordering of P . It is vpid,1 = attSpan and ∀i ∈ [R]\{1} , vpid,i = vpid,i−1+1,
since in every round upid votes for a single post and the first unvoted post of the list
is added to their attention span. Note that, since this mechanism is the same for all
players, the same unvoted post is added to all players’ attention span at every round.
Thus ∀pid ∈ N, vpid,R = attSpan +R− 1
(10)
< M . We deduce that no player has ever the
chance to vote for the last post. The above observation naturally leads us to the following
counterexample: Let
strongPost = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
),nullPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
)
P = [nullPost, . . . ,nullPost︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−1
, strongPost]
∀i ∈ [M − 1] , it is idealSc (P [M ]) > idealSc (P [i]), thus ∀P ′ that contain the same
posts as P and Ideal1 (P ′) holds, it is P ′ [1] = P [M ]. However, since the last post
is not voted by any player and the first post is voted by at least one player, it is
scR (P [1]) > scR (P [M ]), thus Ideal1 (PR) does not hold.
We now move on to the case when attSpan +R > M . Let V = min {R,M}. Each player
casts exactly V votes. Consider P1 = 1M×N and pid ∈ [N ]. Let
i ∈ [V ] :
(
VPregpid,ri < 1 ∧ @i′ < i : VPregpid,ri′ < 1
)
,
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i.e. i is the first round in which upid votes with less than full Voting Power. Such a round
exists in every case as we will show now. Note that, since the first round is a voting
round and the Voting Power of all players is full at the beginning, if i exists it is i ≥ 2.
If R ≥M , it is V = M .
If @i ∈ [M ] :
(
VPregpid,ri < 1 ∧ @i′ < i : VPregpid,ri′ < 1
)
, then we have that ∀i ∈
[M ] ,VPregpid,ri = 1 ⇒ ∀i ∈ [M ] \ {1} , ri ≥ ri−1 +
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
to have enough rounds
to replenish the Voting Power after a full-weight, full-Voting Power vote. Thus
rM ≥ 1 + (M − 1)
⌈
a+b
regen
⌉
> R, contradiction.
If R < M , every player votes on all rounds, thus r2 = 2. Note that⌈
a+ b
regen
⌉
≥ 2⇒ a+ bregen > 1⇒ a+ b > regen . (11)
Thus ∀pid ∈ [N ] ,VPregpid,r2 = 1− a− b+ regen
(11)
< 1, thus i = 2.
We proved that i exists. Since all players follow the same voting pattern, the Voting
Power of all players in each round is the same. Let rVP = VPreg1,ri . Assume that
attSpan < i ∨ i > 2. Please refer to the full version [26] for the case when attSpan ≥
i ∧ i = 2. In case N is even, let 0 < γ < 0, 0 <  < γ (1− rVP),
weakPost = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/2
, γ − , . . . , γ − ︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/2
) ,
strongPost = (γ, . . . , γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/2
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N/2
),nullPost = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
) ,
P = [weakPost, . . . ,weakPost︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, strongPost,nullPost, . . . ,nullPost︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−i
] .
First of all, it is
∀j ∈ [i− 1] , idealSc (P [j]) = N2 (1 + γ − ) <
<
N
2 (1 + γ) = idealSc (P [i])
and ∀j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . ,M} , idealSc (P [j]) = 0 < idealSc (P [i]), thus the strong post has
strictly the highest ideal score of all posts and as a result, ∀P ′ that contains the same
posts as P and Ideal1 (P ′) holds, it is P ′ [1] = P [i].
We observe that all players like both weak and strong posts more than null posts, thus
no player will vote for a null post unless her attention span contains only null posts. This
can happen in two cases: First, if the player has not yet voted for all non-null posts, but
the first attSpan posts of the list, excluding already voted posts, are null posts. Second,
if the player has already voted for all non-null posts. For a null post to rank higher than
a non-null one, it must be true that there exists one player that has cast the first vote for
the null post. However, since the null posts are initially at the bottom of the list and it is
impossible for a post to improve its ranking before it is voted, we deduce that this first
vote can be cast only after the voter has voted for all non-null posts. We deduce that all
players vote for all non-null posts before voting for any null post.
We will now see that the first N2 players vote first for all weak posts and then for the
strong post. These players like the weak posts more than the strong post. As we saw,
they will not vote any null post before voting for all non-null ones. If attSpan > 1 they
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vote for the strong post only when all other posts in their attention span are null ones
and thus they will have voted for all weak posts already. If attSpan = 1 and since no
post can increase its position before being voted, the strong post will become “visible”
for all players only once they have voted for all weak posts. Thus in both cases the first
N
2 players vote for the strong post only after they have voted for all weak posts first.
The two previous results combined prove that the first N2 players vote for the strong post
in round ri exactly. We also observe that these players have experienced the exact same
Voting Power reduction and regeneration as in the case of P1 since they voted only for
posts with likability 1, thus in round ri their Voting Power after regeneration is exactly
the same as in the case of P1 : ∀pid ∈ [N2 ] ,VPregpid,ri = rVP.
We observe that the first N2 players vote for all weak posts with full Voting Power. As for
the last N2 players, we observe that, if attSpan < i, they all vote for the first weak post
of the list in the first round, and thus with full Voting Power. If attSpan ≥ i and i > 2,
they vote for the strong post in the first round and for the first weak post in r2 with full
Voting Power. Thus in all cases the last N2 players vote for the first weak post with full
Voting Power. Therefore, the score of the first weak post at the end of the execution is
scR (P [1]) = N2 (a+ b) + N2 ((γ − ) a+ b).
On the other hand, at the end of the execution the strong post has been voted by the first
N
2 players with rVP Voting Power and by the last
N
2 players with at most full Voting
Power, thus its final score will be at most scR (P [i]) ≤ N2 (rVP · γa+ b) + N2 (a+ b). It is
 < γ (1− rVP)⇒
N
2 (rVP · γa+ b) +
N
2 (a+ b) <
N
2 (a+ b) +
N
2 ((γ − ) a+ b)⇒
scR (P [i]) < scR (P [1]) .
Thus PR [1] 6= P [i] and Ideal1 (PR) does not hold.
As for the case when N is odd, let 0 <  < γN−3N−1 (1− rVP). In this case, we assume
that the likability of the first i posts (weak and strong) for the additional player is γ,
whereas the likability of the last M − i posts (the null posts) is 0. This means that the
additional player votes first for the weak and strong posts and then for the null posts.
The rest of the likabilities remain as in the case when N is even. We observe that the
ideal score of the strong post is still strictly higher than the rest. Furthermore, since the
additional player votes for the first weak post within the first i voting rounds, her Voting
Power at the time of this vote will be at least rVP. We thus have the following bounds
for the scores:
scR (P [i]) ≤ N − 12 (rVP · γa+ b) +
N − 1
2 (a+ b) + γa+ b ,
scR (P [1]) ≥ N − 12 (a+ b) +
N − 1
2 ((γ − ) a+ b) + rVP · γa+ b .
Given the bounds of , it is scR (P [i]) < scR (P [1]), thus Ideal1 (PR) does not hold. J
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B Steem Post Voting System Procedures
Algorithm 3 Init (attSpan, a, b, regen, R,SP).
1: Store input parameters as constants
2: r ← 1
3: lastVoted← (0, . . . , 0) ∈ (N∗)N
4: VP← (1, . . . , 1) ∈ [0, 1]N
5: scores← (0, . . . , 0) ∈ (R+)M
Algorithm 4 Aux.
1: return (attSpan, a, b, r, regen, R,SP)
Algorithm 5 HandleVote (ballot, upid).
1: if lastVotedpid 6= r then . One vote per player per round
2: VPpid,r ← VPpid . For proofs
3: VPpid ← max {VPpid + regen, 1}
4: VPregpid,r ← VPpid . For proofs
5: if ballot 6= null then
6: Parse ballot as (P,weight)
7: cost← a ·VPpid · weight + b
8: if VPpid − cost ≥ 0 then
9: score← cost · SPpid
10: VPpid ← VPpid − cost
11: else
12: score← VPpid · SPpid
13: VPpid ← 0
14: end if
15: scoresP ← scoresP + score
16: end if
17: lastVotedpid ← r
18: end if
19: if ∀i ∈ [N ] , lastVotedi = r then . round over
20: P ← Order (P, scores) . order posts by votes
21: Pr ← P . For proofs
22: r ← r + 1
23: end if
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Algorithm 6 Vote (P, aux).
1: Store aux contents as constants
2: voteRounds← VoteRounds (R, |P|)
3: if VoteThisRound (r, |P|) = yes then
4: top← ChooseTopPosts (attSpan,P, votedPosts)
5: (i, l)← argmax
(i,l)∈top
{lpid}[1]
6: votedPosts← votedPosts ∪ (i, l)
7: return ((i, l) , lpid)
8: else
9: return null
10: end if
11:
12: function ChooseTopPosts(attSpan,P, votedPosts)
13: res← ∅
14: idx← 1
15: while |res| < attSpan & idx ≤ |P| do
16: if P [idx] /∈ votedPosts then . One vote per post per player
17: res← res ∪ {P [idx]}
18: end if
19: idx← idx + 1
20: end while
21: return res
22: end function
23:
24: function VoteThisRound(r,M)
25: if R < M then
26: return yes
27: else if r ∈ voteRounds then
28: return yes
29: else
30: return no
31: end if
32: end function
33:
34: function VoteRounds(R,M)
35: voteRounds← ∅
36: for i = 1 to M do
37: voteRounds← voteRounds ∪
{
1 +
⌊
(i− 1) R−1M−1
⌋}
38: end for
39: return voteRounds
40: end function
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